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ABSTRACT                                                          A 
 
Construction projects do not require a large capital 
outlay but a large working capital to start up the 
project.  Unfortunately, for small contractors there 
are very limited options available from the banks or 
other lending institutions to cover this large 
working capital requirement in the absence of 
sufficient collateral. The “Project Finance” method 
presented in this paper is recommended as the 
most effective method for small contractors in the 
United States.  The problems of small and start up 
contractors in funding their projects have been little 
addressed in the literature.  The current financing 
practices were observed through both the literature 
review and interviews with contractors and 
bankers in the western Michigan area and 
subsequently a system has been proposed which 
could help a small start-up company seeking 
higher growth.  The growth rates that can be 
achieved using the project finance system in 
contrast to the traditional “line of credit” 
arrangements as illustrated in this paper show that 
the project finance model is beneficial.   
 
Key Words: construction financing, contractor 
financing, project financing, construction cash flow, 
financing small firms 
 
INTRODUCTION                                                   A 
 
One of the most pressing problems in construction 
projects is the working capital and liquidity required 
to support day-to-day activities. More construction 
companies go out of business due to lack of 
liquidity to support their day-to-day activities rather 
than lack of technical capability to perform the job 
(Singh and Lokanathan, 1992).  
 
Over 10,000 construction firms failed in the United 
States in 1997, up from 8000 failures in 1990. The 
business failure rate of construction firms is about 
30 percent higher than the national average of all 
industries (Schaufelberger, 1991). Besides various 
other reasons inefficient construction financing 
becomes the most critical cause for this failure.  
This paper reviews the existing financial practices 
in the construction industry and proposes a new 
project financing model for financing small and 
medium scale contractors.  
 
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CONSTRUCTION 
FINANCING                                                          A 
 
The financing problem for small contractors is 
illustrated in the Figure 1.  The finance problem for 
a new construction firm starts after the firm has 
learnt to handle the cash flow for its projects, 
skillfully. Thereafter a need for working capital is 
perceived in order to bid and execute multiple 
projects simultaneously. During the period of 
adolescence, which is a period of up to 4 years (as 
discussed below) from start up, fund may be 
required to aid in juggling between a number of 
cash flows, due to the lack of credit support from 
suppliers. After the period of adolescence when 
the firm is reasonably stabilized and aiming for 
higher growth, yet again there is a requirement for 
greater amount of funds. Unplanned regional 
growth and consequent excessive bidding and 
work orders result in severely straining the 
company‟s financial position. This perpetual need 
for fund to fuel growth calls for an appropriate 
project specific financing mechanism.  The 
problems associated with project financing are 
briefly discussed as below.   
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Figure 1:  Project financing problems for small contractors 
 
THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM 
Some of the most common internal problems 
attributed to liquidity in construction firms are poor 
cash flow prediction and multiple contracts 
undertaken simultaneously.  These internal factors 
coupled with an ill-structured progress 
measurement system financially weaken small 
construction firms.  Several researchers have 
highlighted the cash management problem.  
Navon (1996), Abudayyeh & Rasdorf (1993), Carr 
(1993), and Cook (1991) all have dealt with the 
problem of cash flow or expense flow from 
different perspectives.  While some have 
attempted to predict the cash flow by integrating 
the cost and schedule, others have generated 
mathematical models for forecasting the cash flow 
for a project.  
 
THE WORKING CAPITAL PROBLEM 
It is very difficult for a small company, with limited 
resources, to work simultaneously on multiple 
contracts due to the requirement of a large working 
capital.  Thus the contractors are restricted by the 
availability of liquidity or solvency. The 1992 
census of the US Government, “Census of 
construction industries” showed that though there 
were a huge number of construction companies, 
only the large corporations had considerable 
financial strength to take up the bulk of the job, 
while smaller companies, among other reasons, 
were handicapped on the account of the need for 
working capital.   
 
PACE OF GROWTH 
Construction industry forms an excellent cause for 
the application of the concept of sustainable 
growth as it is more dependent on cash flow and 
working capital as compared to other industries.  If 
the concept of sustainable growth is applied to a 
typical hypothetical construction firm using national 
averages as shown below, then the growth rate 
can be arrived as follows.   
 
Sustainable growth rate =        P (1-d) (1+L)        
                                                T- P (1-d) (1+L) 
    (Westerfield and Jaffe, 1996) 
[Where, T = Average Sales to Assets ratio = 241% 
(BizStats, 2002), P = Average Profit margin = 6.3% 
(BizStats, 2002), d = Average Dividend pay out 
ratio = 45% (UBS Warburg, 2002)
, 
and L = 
Average Debt equity ratio = 2.05 (BizStats, 2002)] 
 
Liability of newness, smallness & Adolescence 
Pace of growth 
Unplanned regional growth 
Increased Design/Build projects 
Working 
Capital  
Non-recourse financing 
Relies on cash flow 
Shares/reduces risks 
Finances multiple projects 
New Project 
Financing Recourse financing 
Excessive risks placed on-  
one party (contractor) 
Collateral intensive 
High solvency 
Line of credit arrangement 
Refinancing 
Mortgage 
Transaction loan 
Current Project Funding Mechanism 
Seek adequate financing 
Only limited financing 
Provides adequate  
financing 
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Sustainable growth rate =   0.063(1-0.45) (1+2.05) 
2.41–0.063(1-0.45) (1+2.05)    
    =   4.58 % 
 
This is lower than the average industry actual 
growth rate of 7% as can be seen from census 
material referenced above.  It thus becomes 
obvious that contractors often seek fund to finance 
the additional growth.  
 
UNPLANNED GROWTH AND UNPREDICTABLE 
FUNDS REQUIREMENT 
The problem of unplanned growth has been 
highlighted in the (year 2000) survey of CFMA 
(Construction Finance Managers Association).  
According to the survey, 65% of the contractors 
anticipated growth in their business volumes but 
only 25 % believed that their growth would be the 
result of planned regional growth (CFMA, 2002). 
This implies that it is very difficult to precisely 
predict the working capital.  Normally, with a longer 
lead-time it is easier to arrange finance while it is 
very difficult to arrange finance at a short notice.  
To efficiently address this problem, lenders or 
bankers will have to adapt a new finance system to 
quickly ascertain the contractor‟s financial 
capability, investigate the credit worthiness of the 
owners and lend accordingly to the need of such 
projects. 
 
LIABILITIES OF A NEW COMPANY 
Further, the need for a higher and sustained 
growth is emphasized by Kale and Arditi (1998). 
By analyzing the age distribution of failed 
construction companies and computing age 
specific failure probabilities over a period of ten 
years, from 1985 to 1994, they identified the period 
of adolescence, being 3 to 4 years, lies in the 
region of increased risk.  According to them, failure 
risk in the US construction industry increases 
initially with increasing age, reaches a peak point 
and decreases there after, as companies grow 
older over a period of 10 years.   
 
THE NEW PROJECT FINANCING 
ARRANGEMENT                                                  A  
 
Besides other performance related problems, the 
critical factors including liability of newness, 
smallness and adolescence, pace of growth, and 
unplanned regional growth could be held 
responsible for the increased rate of business 
failures among the small construction firms.  To 
efficiently handle these factors, a suitable 
construction financing system needs to be 
developed for small contracting businesses so that 
the liabilities and risks brought about by them can 
be efficiently addressed and the deteriorating 
business conditions of the construction firms and 
increased rate of failure can be eliminated.   
 
The „line of credit‟ mechanism predominates 
construction financing.  Other forms of credit 
supports are limited to refinancing, mortgage, and 
transaction loans (Cushman and Bigda, 1985).  
The commonality among all these credit support 
mechanisms is that all of them are collateral 
intensive and the banks unfailingly scrutinize the 
capital adequacy of the company that seeks fund.  
The situation as it exists now is almost an 
impasse, wherein high solvency is imperative for 
obtaining finance to fund growth, which in turn is 
responsible for higher earnings and solvency.  The 
margins in the construction industry are also not 
sufficient to cause any significant growth rate.  
Thus it is the fact that the growth is ultimately 
related to the amount of collateral that a company 
can produce.   
 
The concept of „project finance‟ that has been 
traditionally ignored for small contracting 
businesses can be considered in this situation as it 
promises opportunities for financing based on the 
project cash flow along with reduced risks.  Project 
finance is a non recourse type, asset based 
financing of an economically separable capital 
investment project. The lenders in this case look 
primarily into the cash flow from the project as their 
source of fund to service the loans and provide a 
return on the equity being invested in the project 
(Finnerty, 1996).  The distinguishing feature of 
project financing from conventional financing is 
that unlike conventional financing the lenders do 
not have recourse to the entire portfolio of assets 
of the project sponsor, instead rely only upon the 
cash flow of that specific project.  It becomes 
possible for the lenders to take on high risk in 
Project Financing that incorporates appropriate 
risk assessment and risk transfer.  However 
variants of this form do exist in models wherein the 
lenders have a limited recourse to the asset 
portfolio of the project sponsor. In any project 
finance model the terms of the debt and equity 
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securities are tailored to the cash flow 
characteristics of the project. 
 
In developing a new approach that will manage the 
credit risk of lending to contractors through 
contractual and other bond obligations, the asset 
based limited recourse project specific financing 
can be used.  The nature of the activity of a 
contractor is such that the contractor has to 
produce some significant constructed output by 
investing in the project in order to raise a bill and 
be paid by the owner thus putting the cash flow in 
motion.  Traditionally, the contractor is seldom the 
project owner and it is only the owner who qualifies 
for construction finance.  Permanent finance is 
again out of question, as the contractor is rarely 
involved in the constructed facility during post-
construction period and does not have an 
ownership stake in the constructed facility.  
Commercial mortgage backed securities are 
instruments for reselling an existing permanent 
loan or mortgage. This entirely discounts the 
contractor. Mortgage again is ownership based 
and since the contractor has no ownership stake in 
the constructed facility, he/she cannot mortgage 
the constructed facility. However the contractor 
can mortgage any other property in which he/she 
has ownership stake and use the fund advanced 
on the mortgaged property to start up a 
construction project. Refinancing is a method of 
harnessing the appreciated value of a property 
without selling the property. The contractor can 
thus refinance some of his/her own properties in 
which he/she may have an ownership stake, in 
order to finance one or more projects. Both 
methods while useful for a contractor to raise 
funds are indeed collateral intensive.  Transaction 
loans which are primarily very short-term loans 
advanced to contractors based on the amount of 
immediate receivables do not require any 
collateral, besides, such loans are normally very 
transaction specific.  On the other hand project 
financing which is an outcome of extensive risk 
analysis and transfer has contractual agreements 
put in place such that the revenue generated by 
the asset is paid back to the lenders. It then 
follows that non-recourse financing can be secured 
if sufficient risk analysis and transfer or insurance 
is carried out on a project by project basis. 
Assuming that such extensive risk analysis and 
transfer can be done, the non-recourse funding to 
a contractor will imply assets taking shape in the 
form of lien rights that the bank will come in 
possession of funding the contractor.  The cash 
flow of the construction project will serve the loan 
and similar loans can be successively drawn under 
the same arrangement for a particular project to 
fund the cash requirement of the contractor 
throughout the project.  However various other 
risks such as diversion of cash flow, cost overrun, 
non-payment of suppliers, and the credit risk of the 
bank all necessitate a formal contractual structure.  
Such a contractual arrangement is proposed and 
illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
The central theme of this new model is that the 
banker is recognized by both the contractor and 
owner as the “Third party beneficiary” for all of the 
contractor‟s invoices.  It emphasizes the creation 
of a „Trust Fund‟ account jointly operated by both 
the banker and the contractor.  As the model is 
heavily dependent upon the non-recourse or 
limited recourse financing by the bank, the banker 
should have the right/privilege to operate or control 
the income generated by its investment.  
According to the model, the owner pays the bills 
periodically as per the contract to the trust fund 
joint account.  The balance amount after payment 
of bank dues will be accrued into the contractor‟s 
own account.  This new approach can be 
implemented still within the original conditions of 
AIA (American Institute of Architects) contracts in 
conjunction with the opportunities available in 
other avenues such as UCC (Uniform Commercial 
Code).  In order that this model has a scope for 
implementation, the contractual and risk issues 
including cost overrun, bankruptcy, sub 
contractors‟ or laborers‟ payment related to this 
new approach need to be resolved.   
 
Assigning a „Third Party Beneficiary‟ right to the 
banker who is not a party to the original contract is 
a major challenge to be addressed in this 
approach.  Assignment is not a situation where the 
original parties create rights in a third party as a 
part of the original contract.  Rather, some or all of 
the rights of the original parties are transferred to 
someone who is not a party.  These days 
assignment of rights is an essential part of 
commercial financing.  As per the USA Uniform 
Commercial Code ( UCC Article 9), rights to the 
payment of money for goods sold or services 
rendered can be transferred or assigned to third 
parties either as a security for debt or as an 
outright sale.  In a way, the debtor‟s right to pay 
his/her creditor is destroyed.  The creditor can 
assign the right to receive the debtor‟s payment to 
anyone and the debtor can be required to pay that 
person.  Under the UCC (9-318), the debtor can 
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demand proof that the person claiming the right to 
the debtor‟s payment has in fact been assigned 
that right by the creditor and until the is 
forthcoming the debtor may continue to pay the 
creditor.  In a very real sense a contract becomes 
property at this point where the person to person 
rights created by two parties become transformed 
into a transferable asset which can be used to 
secure loans or can be sold outright (Miller, 1999).  
Therefore, the third party beneficiary assignment 
delineated to the banker through a joint trust fund 
account is more feasible in construction.   
 
The problem of „non payment of sub contractors‟ 
can be efficiently addressed by the mechanism of 
joint trust fund account.  On one hand, the bank 
will be able to retain its dues and on the other 
hand, the banker and the owner will be able to 
closely monitor the transactions between the 
contractor and subcontractor through the trust fund 
account.  Further technique is to issue joint checks 
to both the prime and sub contractors or suppliers.  
Owners have also gone ahead and mandated 
contractors to establish separate trust bank 
accounts for receipt and disbursement (Sweet, 
1992).  In addition, the courts allowing laborers 
and suppliers to recover as beneficiaries of 
payment bonds, irrespective of the owner being 
private or government has overwhelmingly upheld 
the logic and sanctity of payment bonds 
(Farnsworth, 1999).  However, this model would 
require the contractor to furnish a payment bond at 
his/her own cost to indemnify the bank that lends 
money in the event that the owner did not require it 
from the contractor.   
 
Given the nature of the financial transactions 
involved in the model, insurance of risks involved 
therein gains importance.  Environmental issues 
and poor productivity can result in huge cost 
implications.  Design and estimation errors are 
covered by the „Professional Liability Insurance‟, 
while environmental risk and cost overrun risks are 
insured by „Cost Cap‟ and „Cost Overrun 
Insurance‟ respectively. 
 
The obligations of the parties involved in the new 
arrangement are provided below.   
 
Expected Owner’s obligation in the new 
arrangement 
 
 The owner agrees to pay all bills raised by the 
contractor into a trust fund account as per 
agreed „schedule of payments‟.  
 The owner mandates lien waivers at each 
billing stage for all material supplied by the 
contractor and financed by the bank, for which 
the owner has made payment.    
 The owner recognizes the banker as the “Third 
party beneficiary” for all of the contractor‟s 
invoices. 
 The contractual agreement with the contractor 
is based on the AIA format. 
 
Expected Banker’s obligation in the new 
arrangement  
 
 The banker agrees to fund all the cash 
requirement of the project as per estimates, 
until the owner reimburses the same via 
progress payments into the trust fund account.  
 The banker agrees to jointly operate the trust 
fund account for the disbursement of funds to 
the sub contractors. 
 Banker is assigned as the “Third party 
beneficiary” for the invoices of the contractor.  
 
 
Expected Contractor’s obligation in the new 
arrangement  
 
 The contractor should receive payment from 
the owner through the trust fund account 
 The contractor agrees with the Banker and the 
Owner to jointly operate the trust fund account 
with the Banker for the disbursement of funds 
to sub contractors. 
 The contractor agrees to purchase cost 
overrun insurance and payment bonds and in 
this regard agrees to indemnify the banker for 
all loses arising out of reasons attributable to 
the contractor. 
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Figure 2: The New Project Finance Model 
 
 The contractor agrees not to extract the free 
cash flow from the project until the end of the 
project and the payment of all bank dues. 
 The contractor assigns the Banker as the 
“Third party beneficiary”.  
 Contractor offers minimum collateral to the 
bank, which could offset any residual risk that 
the bank might perceive. 
 The AIA format is adopted for the contractual 
agreement with the owner. 
 
THE POTENTIAL RESPONSE OF THE NEW 
PROJECT FINANCE ARRANGEMENT TO THE 
CURRENT PROBLEMS                                       A 
 
It is critical to ascertain whether this new 
arrangement will help alleviating various problems 
faced by the contractors as highlighted in the 
foregoing sections.  The possible response of the 
new arrangement to the traditional financing 
problems are highlighted below: 
 
The liquidity problem: The above arrangement 
requires a high proficiency in cash flow analysis, 
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management and structuring of the progress 
measurement system and job planning in such a 
way that the banks and owners are both 
comfortable with. 
 
The working capital problem: The situation that 
„lack of funds inhibiting new project opportunities‟ 
can be prevented by carefully structuring the new 
projects to be funded by project based finance. 
 
Liability of newness, smallness & adolescence: 
High growth is required to overcome these 
liabilities. However it is not possible for a bank to 
assess risks on a contracting company without 
having its historical data.  This implies that 
contracting companies, which are new, would at-
least have to overcome their start-up liabilities, 
which is approximately four years after starting up 
of the firm in order to attract any project based 
financing from the banks.  This difficulty is 
attributable only to the „newness‟ and 
„adolescence‟ of construction companies.  
„Smallness‟ of the company is still unaffected 
provided the company has historical data to 
convince the bank.  Further investigation is 
required to encapsulate the liabilities of newness 
and adolescence in project financing.   
 
Pace of growth: Growth, which is based 
predominantly on volumes in the construction 
industry can be hastened to a considerable extent 
by the ability to take up large sized projects with 
relatively low initial investment by the contractors. 
This comes about due to the bank‟s funding of the 
initial start up costs of the contractor. 
 
Unplanned growth: Availability of project based 
financing as shown in Figure 2 can completely 
offset this problem, provided that the contracting 
company in question is qualified with a bank and 
has an understanding with them of the procedural 
requirements of project based financing. 
 
Thus, out of the major problems, the project based 
financing method outlined in Figure 2 has the 
potential to solve at least four of them, including 
the working capital problem, pace of growth, 
unplanned growth, and newness.  
 
ASSESSING CONTRACTOR CAPABILITY IN 
THE PROJECT FINANCE MODEL                      A 
 
While project finance approach may be a potential 
panacea to some of the problems of a contractor, 
a banker would rarely exhibit enthusiasm in 
lending for such ventures without a thorough 
analysis of a contractor‟s competence and some 
collateral to address the residual risk which the 
bank might face. Research carried out by Price 
and Shawa (1997) in the United Arab Emirates 
where similar financing methods are in practice 
also supports the above view. A number of 
attributes of the contracting firm thus gain 
importance, as they would face possible scrutiny 
by the lending bank. Some of the attributes as 
suggested by Strischek, (1996) for the bankers to 
scrutinize prospective contractors can be adopted.  
They include: contractors‟ technical capability to do 
the job and past experience in doing similar jobs or 
project; contractors‟ balance sheet; adequacy of 
working capital; financial standing of the 
contractor‟s owner; project feasibility; tender make 
up to ensure that the price quoted by the 
contractor is in the same range as others; cash 
flow of the project; cash flow of the parent 
company; progress monitoring system.  It is hard 
for the contractor to convince the banker on some 
of the attributes such as financial standing of the 
owner and tender make up as they are beyond the 
control of the contractor.  As the model seeks a 
strong involvement of the owner, it is expected that 
the owner, in his/her project‟s interests and 
benefits, furnishes the required information and 
evidence to convince the banker.  Adequacy of 
working capital is another barrier for the contractor 
to convince the banker, which can be overcome by 
producing evidence for successful cash flow 
management in previous projects.   
 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
USING PROJECT FINANCE MODEL                  A 
 
Advantages to the Contractor: 
 Value earned for the contractor‟s 
competence in undertaking projects. 
 Capability to take on larger projects. 
 Higher growth opportunities for the 
contractor company. 
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 Creditors have limited recourse to other 
company assets. 
 Ease of accounting for tax purposes. 
 Enhancement of bonding capacity due to 
low risk in the project finance model. 
 Possibility of lower insurance and bonding 
costs. 
 
Disadvantages to the contractor: 
 Extensive risk analysis & management is 
to be done for each project.  
 Large bank fees and other transaction 
costs can become a burden. 
 Well-qualified personnel are required to 
support the complications of project 
finance.  
 Diversion of funds from the cash flow of 
the project for other purposes is not 
possible. 
 The high degree of control that a bank will 
exercise might conflict with other business 
commitments or agreements, which the 
contractor may have. 
 Liabilities of the trust fund account. 
 
Advantages to the Banks: 
 Scope for fee generating services. 
 Security of funds lent. 
 Short term lending opportunity, which is 
less cumbersome and risky. 
 The project can be insulated from the 
contractor‟s possible bankruptcy due to 
other projects. 
 The proposed model opens up a high-risk 
„contractor finance‟ market. 
 
Disadvantages to the Banks: 
 Project risks have to be shared by the 
banks. 
 Due to the limited recourse nature, banks 
stand to loose at least the interest 
earnings on the money they lend to the 
contractor. 
 Due to the specialized nature of this 
transaction, banks will have to appoint 
someone who has sufficient experience in 
dealing with project based finance and 
also has adequate knowledge of the 
construction industry.  
 
Advantages to the owners: 
 Reduction of risk of non performance by 
contractor due to preventing diversion of 
cash flow 
 Reduction of “Course of construction risk” 
due to guaranteed payment of sub 
contractors and making available stage 
wise lien waivers. 
 High degree of legalities mandates 
professionalism from contractors. 
 High degree of control over contractor. 
 Lower risk of cost overrun due to high level 
of project control. 
 
Disadvantages to the owners: 
 Higher legal exposure  
 
CONTRACTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
MODEL                                                                 A 
 
Further, the problem of „non payment of sub 
contractors‟ exists in the AIA clauses (American 
Institute of Architects).  The AIA does not require 
the contractor to submit evidence of payment to 
sub contractor or lien waivers, as a condition to 
receiving progress payments. (AIA-A201-Clause 
9.3). Nor does certification under A-201, Clause 
9.4.2 represent that the architect has reviewed sub 
contractor or supplier requisitions or that he has 
determined to whom the previous payments have 
been made. Finally, clause 9.6.4. states that the 
owner or architect has no obligation to see to it 
that the sub contractors are paid except as 
required by law (Sweet, 1992). The above loop 
holes in the AIA documents have been plugged by 
most owners by using trust fund statutes. Trust 
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fund statutes impress funds paid to the contractor 
with a trust, with severe penalties for breach of 
trust by the contractor. Owners have also gone 
ahead and mandated contractors to establish 
separate trust bank accounts for receipt and 
disbursement (Sweet, 1992). The Texas “Trapping 
statute” allows an owner to withhold, and pay sub 
contractor directly if the latter notifies the owner 
that it has not been paid and the prime contractor 
has no objection. 
 
The above two options are not very different from 
the arrangement suggested in Figure 2, except 
that the bank is the only major subcontractor and 
has joint signing authority for the trust fund 
account. Another technique is to issue joint checks 
to both, the prime and sub contractors or suppliers 
(Sweet, 1992). This again prevents diversion of 
project cash flow. Thus by creating a trust fund 
account or by issuing joint checks for the payment 
due to various parties including the bank, the 
diversion of funds can be prevented.  
 
VALIDATION OF IMPETUS TO GROWTH          A 
 
The growth of a construction contracting company 
under project finance can be assessed using the 
historical data of that company. However on 
account of the unavailability of such data to the 
researcher, the pertinent financial data have been 
assumed. The profitability of a construction 
company has been constructed as given in Table 
1, over a period of 13 years wherein the 
Construction Company, hereinafter called as 
„company‟, has been funded by the line of credit 
mechanism. 
 
Column 5 is the turnover of business the company 
can anticipate assuming that any given project will 
have at least four running account bills leading to 
project completion. Column 6 indicates a profit of 
8% on the turnover that a small construction 
company can expect. Note that this is higher than 
the industry average, which stands at 7 %. This 
has been assumed arbitrarily to account for the 
low overheads that a small company is likely to 
have. Column 7 indicates the interest paid by the 
company for the money borrowed in the line of 
credit, which is assumed at 20%.  Column 8 
indicates the amount of earnings that the company 
can anticipate before taxes and is calculated by 
deducting the figures in column 7 from those in 
column 6.  Column 9 indicates the taxes that the 
company will be expected to pay. This has been 
assumed at a corporate tax rate of 34%. Thus the 
figures in column 9 are 66% of those in column 8. 
Column 11 indicates the percentage growth in the 
turnover of the company over the previous year.  
 
On computing the average growth of the turnover 
(column 11) over a period of 13 years we get an 
average growth rate of 5.87% every year. This is 
the likely average growth for a company using the 
line of credit mechanism for funding its operation. 
 
On the other hand consider the same company 
having secured project finance for some or one of 
its projects. This has been depicted in Table 2. 
Note that this table has three additional columns; 
5A, 5B, and 5C.  All other columns except column 
6 are identical.  Column 5A indicates the amount 
of project financing that the company has secured 
.The sum of $150,000 has been arbitrarily 
assumed. The reason that project finance funds 
are being sought only in the sixth year of operation 
is because the liability of adolescence, newness 
and smallness, begin to recede only after 5 years 
(refer Figure 1). 
 
Column 5B indicates the turnover that can be 
achieved using additional project finance funds 
and the assumption again is that there will be at 
least four running account bills leading to project 
completion. The figures in column 5B are thus 4 
times those in 5A. Column 5C is the sum total of 
column 5B and 5 and indicates the total turnover of 
the company. 
 
When compared for annual growth in volume 
(column 11) Tables 1 and 2 indicate that infusion 
of project finance funds results in an abrupt 
increase in turn over. Assuming that the company 
avails project finance funds keeping in view the 
elements of sustainable growth outlined in the 
foregoing pages, the average growth for a period 
of 13 years for this company comes out to be 
12.28% as computed from column 11 of Table 2. 
This is twice the average growth computed from 
column 11 of Table 1. However this growth rate of 
12.28% needs to be adjusted for increased 
insurance costs arising out of the Project Finance 
arrangement, which is enunciated below.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Year Revolvin
g 
Line of 
Credit 
Personal  
Capital 
Total 
Investment/ 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
@ 4 
times the 
working  
Capital 
Profit @ 
8% of 
Turnover 
Interest 
Payment 
@ 20% 
on 
barrowing 
Total 
Earnings 
Before  
Tax 
Earnings 
After 
Tax 
@ 34% 
% 
Returns 
on 
personal 
capital 
invested 
% 
Growth 
in 
turnover 
Investment 
in assets 
at 50% of 
net 
earnings 
1  150,000  22,500  172,500  690,000  55,200  30,000  25,200  16,632  74    8,316  
2  150,000  30,816  180,816  723,264  57,861  30,000  27,861  18,388  60  4.60  9,194  
3  150,000  40,010  190,010  760,041  60,803  30,000  30,803  20,330  51  4.84  10,165  
4  150,000  50,175  200,175  800,701  64,056  30,000  34,056  22,477  45  5.08  11,239  
5  150,000  61,414  211,414  845,655  67,652  30,000  37,652  24,851  40  5.32  12,425  
6  150,000  73,839  223,839  895,356  71,628  30,000  41,628  27,475  37  5.55  13,737  
7  150,000  87,576  237,576  950,306  76,024  30,000  46,024  30,376  35  5.78  15,188  
8  150,000  102,765  252,765  1,011,058  80,885  30,000  50,885  33,584  33  6.01  16,792  
9  150,000  119,556  269,556  1,078,226  86,258  30,000  56,258  37,130  31  6.23  18,565  
10  150,000  138,122  288,122  1,152,486  92,199  30,000  62,199  41,051  30  6.44  20,526  
11  150,000  158,647  308,647  1,234,589  98,767  30,000  68,767  45,386  29  6.65  22,693  
12  150,000  181,340  331,340  1,325,362  106,029  30,000  76,029  50,179  28  6.85  25,090  
13  150,000  206,430  356,430  1,425,720  114,058  30,000  84,058  55,478  27  7.04  27,739  
 
Table 1: Company funded by the Line-of-Credit mechanism 
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1 2 3 4 5 5A 5B 5C 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Year Revolving 
Line of 
Credit 
Personal  
Capital 
Total 
Investment/ 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
@ 4 
times the 
working  
Capital 
Project 
Finance 
(PF) 
fund 
Turnover 
using PF  
Fund 
Total 
turnover 
Profit @ 
8% of 
Turnover 
Interest 
Payment 
@ 20% 
on 
barrowing 
Total 
Earnings 
Before  
Tax 
Earnings 
After 
Tax 
@ 34% 
% 
Returns 
on 
personal 
capital 
invested 
% 
Growth 
in 
turnover 
Investment 
in assets 
at 50% of 
net 
earnings 
1  150,000  22,500  172,500  690,000  0  0  690,000  55,200  30,000  25,200  16,632  74   8,316  
2  150,000  30,816  180,816  723,264  0  0  723,264  57,861  30,000  27,861  18,388  60  4.60  9,194  
3  150,000  40,010  190,010  760,041  0  0  760,041  60,803  30,000  30,803  20,330  51  4.84  10,165  
4  150,000  50,175  200,175  800,701  0  0  800,701  64,056  30,000  34,056  22,477  45  5.08  11,239  
5  150,000  61,414  211,414  845,655  0  0  845,655  67,652  30,000  37,652  24,851  40  5.32  12,425  
6  150,000  73,839  223,839  895,356  150,000  600,000  1,495,356  119,628  60,000  59,628  39,355  53  43.45  19,677  
7  150,000  93,516  243,516  974,066  150,000  600,000  1,574,066  125,925  60,000  65,925  43,511  47  5.00  21,755  
8  150,000  115,272  265,272  1,061,087  150,000  600,000  1,661,087  132,887  60,000  72,887  48,105  42  5.24  24,053  
9  150,000  139,324  289,324  1,157,298  250,000  1,000,000  2,157,298  172,584  80,000  92,584  61,105  44  23.00  30,553  
10  150,000  169,877  319,877  1,279,509  250,000  1,000,000  2,279,509  182,361  80,000  102,361  67,558  40  5.36  33,779  
11  150,000  203,656  353,656  1,414,625  400,000  1,600,000  3,014,625  241,170  110,000  131,170  86,572  43  24.38  43,286  
12  150,000  246,942  396,942  1,587,769  400,000  1,600,000  3,187,769  255,022  110,000  145,022  95,714  39  5.43  47,857  
13  150,000  294,799  444,799  1,779,197  500,000  2,000,000  3,779,197  302,336  130,000  172,336  113,742  39  15.65  56,871  
 
Table 2: Company funded by the Project Finance method 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR THE IMPACT OF 
INSURANCE COSTS                                           A 
 
As mentioned earlier in this article, the insurance 
for cost over run in particular adds up 1% to 2% on 
the project cost. For the purpose of calculating the 
impact of increased insurance costs on growth we 
will consider the increased cost to be at 1% and 
thus reduce the profit margin of the contractor by 
1%. The corresponding calculations are reflected 
in Table 3 and it is seen that the profitability of the 
contractor drops to 7% of the turnover and the 
average growth over a period of 13 years drops to 
11.42% from 12.28% achieved in Table 2. Thus 
we see that even if we assume that Project finance 
attracts higher insurance costs the growth rate 
achievable with this method is greater than that 
can be achieved in a traditional “Line of credit” 
arrangement.  
 
A comparison of the growth rates generated by 
both methods of financing is graphically shown in 
Figure 3. While the PF model is highly non-linear 
in comparison with the LOC model, the average 
linear growth rate over a period of 13 years works 
up to be 11.42%. Consequently, the contractor can 
anticipate doing a turnover of USD 3,411,966/- in 
the 13
th
 year of profitable operation, which is 239% 
higher than that he could anticipate using the LOC 
model. 
 
EXPERT OPINION ON THE MODEL                   A 
 
The feasibility of the proposed project-financing 
model was examined by seeking opinions from 
three major parties (Bankers, Owners and 
Contractors).  The connectivity between the 
various elements and the responsibility arising out 
of the same as contractual obligations, were 
structured as questions in separate questionnaires 
designed for each of the potential parties to the 
mechanism. There were 13 different samples 
including 5 bankers, 5 owners and 3 contractors. 
The responses to each of the questions were 
solicited through personal interviews lasting over 
two hours and their voice was recorded with their 
permission.  Due to the lengthy nature of the 
discussion with the bankers, owners and 
contractors, the opinions of various parties 
gathered in those interviews are summarized as 
follows.  
 
All banks have agreed to lend money on the basis 
of the proposed model and adopt the required 
contractual obligations. While some bankers 
perceived lower risk in the model others sought 
more legal opinion. The assumption of a 20% 
interest rate on a consolidated basis in the 
calculations in Tables 1, 2 and 3 stands validated 
by their answers that the consolidated interest 
including the banks management fees is not likely 
to exceed 10%. This in turn serves to strengthen 
achievable growth and profitability calculated in 
Tables 1 and 2. The assumption that “project 
based finance is feasible only after a four year 
period” is also validated by the bankers responding 
this period to be within a range of 3 to 10 years.   
 
The discussion with the owners, in general, 
showed a positive response to the model.  In 
specific, they strongly argued that the insurance 
and payment bond costs would be much lower 
than the existing arrangements.  This serves to 
augment the envisaged growth rates and also 
makes the model friendlier to the insurance 
companies. The discussion with the owners 
brought to light the limitations that may be posed 
by the model. One of the owners who represented 
the government expressed inability to pay into the 
trust fund account and hence deemed the model 
not serving their interests. 
 
It became evident in the discussion with the 
contractors that, they would be agreeable to their 
contractual obligations under the proposed model. 
One of the contractors being very small in size and 
new in the industry expressed an inability to 
dispense with using the free cash flow generated 
from the project or to purchase bonds. 
 
MODEL ASSESSMENT BY “WHAT IF - 
ANALYSIS”                                                          A 
 
In this section, the model is hypothetically 
assessed within the context of engineering, legal 
and financial scenarios using “What if? Analysis”.  
The analysis is based on the foregoing discussions 
of the model and the views and subjective analysis 
of the author.  The analysis is presented in Table 
4.
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1 2 3 4 5 5A 5B 5C 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Year Revolving 
Line of 
Credit 
Personal  
Capital 
Total 
Investment/ 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
@ 4 
times the 
working  
Capital 
Project 
Finance 
(PF) 
fund 
Turnover 
using PF  
Fund 
Total 
turnover 
Profit @ 
7% of 
Turnover 
Interest 
Payment 
@ 20% 
on 
barrowing 
Total 
Earnings 
Before  
Tax 
Earnings 
After 
Tax 
@ 34% 
% 
Returns 
on 
personal 
capital 
invested 
% 
Growth 
in 
turnover 
Investment 
in assets 
at 50% of 
net 
earnings 
1  150,000  22,500  172,500  690,000  0  0  690,000  48,300  30,000  18,300  12,078  54    6,039  
2  150,000  28,539  178,539  714,156  0  0  714,156  49,991  30,000  19,991  13,194  46  3.38  6,597  
3  150,000  35,136  185,136  740,544  0  0  740,544  51,838  30,000  21,838  14,413  41  3.56  7,207  
4  150,000  42,343  192,343  769,370  0  0  769,370  53,856  30,000  23,856  15,745  37  3.75  7,872  
5  150,000  50,215  200,215  800,860  0  0  800,860  56,060  30,000  26,060  17,200  34  3.93  8,600  
6  150,000  58,815  208,815  835,260  150,000  600,000  1,435,260  100,468  60,000  40,468  26,709  45  44.20  13,354  
7  150,000  72,169  222,169  888,678  150,000  600,000  1,488,678  104,207  60,000  44,207  29,177  40  3.59  14,588  
8  150,000  86,758  236,758  947,031  150,000  600,000  1,547,031  108,292  60,000  48,292  31,873  37  3.77  15,936  
9  150,000  102,694  252,694  1,010,777  250,000  1,000,000  2,010,777  140,754  80,000  60,754  40,098  39  23.06  20,049  
10  150,000  122,743  272,743  1,090,973  250,000  1,000,000  2,090,973  146,368  80,000  66,368  43,803  36  3.84  21,901  
11  150,000  144,645  294,645  1,178,579  400,000  1,600,000  2,778,579  194,501  110,000  84,501  55,770  39  24.75  27,885  
12  150,000  172,530  322,530  1,290,119  400,000  1,600,000  2,890,119  202,308  110,000  92,308  60,924  35  3.86  30,462  
13  150,000  202,992  352,992  1,411,966  500,000  2,000,000  3,411,966  238,838  130,000  108,838  71,833  35  15.29  35,916  
 
Table 3: Company funded by the Project Finance method with insurance costs reflecting on average growth 
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Growth Rates of the PF and the LOC Models. 
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What if? Situations Responses 
1.  What if the contractor fails to perform the job? Then who 
will perform the job and who will pay the bank? 
Bonding company will perform the job and pay the 
bank 
2. What if the owner does not pay? Amounts to breach of contract; Property is liened 
3. What if the subcontractor does not perform? Prime contractor is responsible for the scope 
4. How does the contractor‟s bank become eligible for holding 
the lien on the owner‟s property? 
Bank plays the role of a supplier and is hence 
eligible  
5. What if, due to the nature of the project, the progress is 
nonlinear and results in an abrupt increase in working 
capital requirement, thus rendering the start-up money 
arrangement with the bank futile? 
The borrowing plan should be in accordance with 
progress, whether linear or non-linear. 
6 What if the project cost overruns? Contractor will bear it personally or through 
insurance.  
7 What if the contractor‟s project incurs a loss for some 
reason? How will the bank be indemnified? 
Contractor will indemnify personally or through 
insurance 
8 What if the owner‟s architect rejects some material that has 
been paid for by the bank, but has not been paid for by the 
owner yet? 
Defective material will be covered by warranty. 
Damage due to accident will be covered by 
insurance. 
9 What if the banker is not knowledgeable enough to 
understand the construction process in order to oversee 
disbursement? 
Banker can use a title company. 
10 What if AIA –A-201, A-301, A-311 and A312 are not the 
norm? 
Contractual arrangement will have to be redrafted 
11 Why should the banker be assigned as a third party 
beneficiary to all of the invoices if the payment bonds 
already indemnify him? 
As the Banker is to receive and control payments 
into the trust fund account. 
12 Why should an owner cooperate with a contractor with 
such an arrangement if he can find another contractor who 
can operate traditionally? 
Owner has numerous hidden benefits 
13 Why should the bank and subcontractors give stage wise 
lien waivers when A-201 does not mandate it? 
Stage wise lien waivers lower risk and 
corresponding premiums for the payment bonds. 
14 If a contractor has a track record of having successfully 
and profitably executed projects, why should he agree to 
retention of his profit in the trust fund account? 
Security to banker and incentive for contractor to 
finish early. 
15 What if there is a labor strike? Losses can be recovered under insurance as it is a 
„Force Majeure‟ event. 
16 The proposed model implies that the contractor will have to 
follow “Completed contract method” for accounting. The 
government does not easily permit this, hence it may not 
be possible to implement the model. 
Percentage completion method can be easily 
followed. In this case it becomes very accurate; 
minimizing the liabilities of tax look back.  
17 What if the contractor has exhausted his bonding capacity 
in other projects? 
Risk in this model is low, hence bonding company 
could consider increase in bonding capacity. 
18 In allowing such tight control by the bank, is there not a risk 
of losing ownership of the contractor‟s company? 
Bank may only sell a loan, not an ownership stake in 
the contractor‟s company.  
19 Why should a bank lend without collateral or with minimum 
collateral when currently they seek and get collateral for 
their lending? 
Contractors are a high-risk segment to bankers and 
the segment is currently not exploited. 
20 What if the legal costs are so high that the venture 
becomes non-viable? 
Cost Benefit analysis may have to be done before 
abandoning the project. 
21 What if a „Force Majeure‟ event occurs on site and the 
material or works not paid for by the owner are lost or 
destroyed? 
Stands covered by insurance 
22 At times the banks may employ „Title companies‟. What if a 
Title company hired by the bank makes a mistake or 
defrauds and authorizes release of more money from the 
trust fund account? 
Losses can be recovered from the title company‟s 
insurance provider. 
23 What if the banker and the contractor come in league and 
defraud the trust fund account together? 
The model does not offer immunity to fraud. 
Table 4: What If? Analysis 
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ANTICIPATED LIMITATIONS                              A 
 
 The model may not work for government 
contracts, as two of the owners who 
represented the government expressed 
inability to pay the contractor‟s invoices 
into trust fund accounts. 
 The model may not work for 
subcontractors attempting to use the 
proposed model to secure finance, as 
there would be two levels of 
indemnification involved and possibly 
three banks. The financial and legal costs 
of the model may also deem the model 
nonviable for subcontractors with very 
small turnover. 
 The proposed model requires the bank to 
employ construction related experts. 
 
CONCLUSIONS                                                    A 
 
An alternate Project Finance system has been 
proposed in this paper.  Given the agreement of 
various parties as outlined from the interviews, 
though pending legal approval, the proposed 
model stands validated on key aspects including 
contractual, transaction, company growth, and 
financial risks. Finally, the „What if - Analysis‟ 
addresses some potentially vexing scenarios that 
were haunting construction financing for a long 
time.   
 
Thus, given the advantages of project-based 
financing to the banks, contractors, and owners 
alike, it can be concluded that there is a scope for 
the application of project-based financing to small 
and medium construction projects. However, as 
outlined in this study, project-based financing 
requires a lot of attention to details and 
professional handling on the part of both the lender 
and the borrower, and may be limited in 
applicability to private contracts.  The model yet 
requires to be validated empirically with real world 
data for different project circumstances.  It also 
sets a new direction for future research in 
construction financing.   
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